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Abstract
This paper proposes two models in which price stickiness arises endogenously even though
rms are free to change their prices at zero physical cost. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks, and they also face a risk of making errors when they set their prices. In
our rst specication, rms are assumed to play a dynamic logit equilibrium, which implies
that big mistakes are less likely than small ones. The second specication derives logit
behavior from an assumption that precision is costly. The empirical implications of the two
versions of our model are very similar. Since rms making suciently large errors choose to
adjust, both versions generate a strong "selection eect" in response to a nominal shock that
eliminates most of the monetary nonneutrality found in the Calvo model. Thus the model
implies that money shocks have little impact on the real economy, as in Golosov and Lucas
(2007), but ts microdata better than their specication.
Keywords: logit equilibrium, state-dependent pricing, (S,s) adjustment, near rational-
ity, information-constrained pricing
JEL Codes: E31, D81, C725
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Non-Technical Summary
Economic conditions change continually. A ﬁrm that attempts to maintain an optimal price
in response to these changes faces at least two costly managerial challenges. First, it must
repeatedly decide when to post new prices. Second, for each price update, it must choose what
new price to post. Since both decisions are costly, managers may suﬀer errors or frictions along
either margin. The most familiar models of nominal rigidity have studied frictions in the ﬁrst
decision, assuming that price adjustments can only occur intermittently, either with exogenous
frequency (as in Calvo, 1983) or with endogenous frequency (e.g. Golosov and Lucas, 2007;
Dotsey et al. 2009; Costain and Nakov 2011A, B). This paper instead explores the implications
of frictions in the second decision. In other words, we assume that ﬁrms can adjust their prices
costlessly in any period, but that whenever they adjust, their price choice is subject to errors. We
study the implications of frictions along this margin both for microeconomic price adjustment
data and for macroeconomic dynamics.
Our key assumption is that the probability of setting any given price is a smoothly increas-
ing function of the expected present discounted value of setting that price. Our model nests
full frictionless rationality as the limiting case in which the ﬁrm sets the optimal price with
probability one every period. More speciﬁcally, we impose this assumption on our model in two
diﬀerent ways. In the ﬁrst version of our model, we assume the probability distribution over
price choices is a logit function. The general equilibrium of this version of the model is therefore
a logit equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998): the probability of each ﬁrm’s choice is
a logit function which depends on the value of each choice; moreover, the value of each choice is
determined, in equilibrium, by the logit choice probabilities of other ﬁrms.
While this version of the model does not impose price stickiness directly, the risk of errors
gives rise to a certain degree of endogenous price stickiness. Because they fear they may “trem-
ble” when choosing a new price, ﬁrms may refrain from adjusting, on precautionary grounds,
even when their current price is not exactly optimal. Whenever the ﬁrm’s price is suﬃciently
close to the optimum, it prefers to “leave well enough alone”, thus avoiding the risk of making
a costly mistake. Hence behavior has an (S,s) band structure, in which adjustment occurs only
if the current price is suﬃciently far from the optimum.
In a second version of our model, we derive logit behavior from an assumption that precision
is costly. We show that the distribution of price adjustments takes logit form if decision costs are
proportional to entropy reduction. Thus, this speciﬁcation involves a cost of price adjustment,
but it is not a “menu cost” in the sense of labor time devoted to the physical task of adjusting
posted prices. Instead, the cost of price adjustment can be understood as a cost of managerial
control, consistent with the evidence of Zbaracki et al. (2004). The welfare losses due to price
stickiness are lower in this interpretation of the model, since a stickier price allows for a reduction
in managerial costs.
The logit framework for modeling bounded rationality has been widely applied in experi-
mental game theory, where it has very successfully explained play in a number of games where
Nash equilibrium performs poorly, such as the centipede game and Bertrand competition games
(McKelvey and Palfrey 1998; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2002). It has been much less fre-
quently applied in other areas of economics; we are unaware of any application of logit equilib-
rium inside a dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model. Another possible reason why
m a c r o e c o n o m i s t sh a v es or a r e l yc o n s i d e r e de r r o r - p r o n ec h o i c ei st h a te r r o r si m p l yh e t e r o g e n e -
ity; the computational simplicity of a representative agent model may be lost if agents diﬀer6
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because of small, random mistakes. However, when applied to state-dependent pricing, this
problem is less relevant, since it has long been argued that it is important to allow for hetero-
geneity in order to understand the dynamics of “sticky” adjustment models (see for example
Caplin and Spulber 1987, Caballero 1992, and Golosov and Lucas 2007). Moreover, we have
shown (Costain and Nakov 2008B) how distributional dynamics can be tractably characterized
in general equilibrium, without relying on special functional forms or questionable numerical
aggregation assumptions. The same numerical method we used in that paper (Reiter 2009) can
be applied to a logit equilibrium model; in fact, the smoothness of the logit case makes it even
easier to compute than the fully rational case. We therefore ﬁnd that logit equilibrium opens
the door to tractable models with implications both for macroeconomic and for microeconomic
data.
Summarizing our main ﬁndings, both versions of our model are consistent with several “puz-
zling” stylized facts from micro price adjustment data, in spite of the fact that the model has
only one free parameter to estimate. Our model implies that many large and small price changes
coexist (see Fig. 2), in contrast to the implications of a ﬁxed menu cost model (Midrigan, 2010;
Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2009). It also implies that the probability of
price adjustment decreases rapidly over the ﬁrst few months, and then remains essentially ﬂat
(Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2009). Third, we ﬁnd that the standard de-
viation of price changes is approximately constant, independent of the time since last adjustment
(Klenow and Malin, 2009). Most alternative frameworks, including the Calvo model, instead
imply that price changes are increasing in the time since last adjustment. Fourth, “extreme”
prices are more likely to have been recently set than are prices near the center of the distribution
(Campbell and Eden, 2010). While a variety of explanations have been oﬀered for some of these
observations (including sales, economies of scope in price setting, and heterogeneity among price
setters), our framework matches all these facts in a very simple way, with only one degree of
freedom in the parameterization.
Finally, we calculate the eﬀects of money supply shocks in our framework. Given the degree
of rationality that best ﬁts microdata, the eﬀect of money shocks on consumption is roughly
twice as large as in the Golosov-Lucas (2007) ﬁxed menu cost setup. The eﬀect is much weaker
than in the Calvo model because of a selection eﬀect: all the ﬁrms that require the largest
price adjustments do in fact adjust. Thus, a model in which price adjustment is slowed down
by mistakes ﬁts microdata much better than a ﬁxed menu cost model, but implies that the
macroeconomy is relatively close to monetary neutrality.7
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1 Introduction1
Economic conditions change continually. A ﬁrm that attempts to maintain an optimal price
in response to these changes faces at least two costly managerial challenges. First, it must
repeatedly decide when to post new prices. Second, for each price update, it must choose what
new price to post. Since both decisions are costly, managers may suﬀer errors or frictions along
either margin. The most familiar models of nominal rigidity have studied frictions in the ﬁrst
decision, assuming that price adjustments can only occur intermittently, either with exogenous
frequency (as in Calvo, 1983) or with endogenous frequency (e.g. Golosov and Lucas, 2007;
Dotsey et al. 2009; Costain and Nakov 2011A, B). This paper instead explores the implications
of frictions in the second decision. In other words, we assume that ﬁrms can adjust their prices
costlessly in any period, but that whenever they adjust, their price choice is subject to errors. We
study the implications of frictions along this margin both for microeconomic price adjustment
data and for macroeconomic dynamics.
Our key assumption is that the probability of setting any given price is a smoothly increas-
ing function of the expected present discounted value of setting that price. Our model nests
full frictionless rationality as the limiting case in which the ﬁrm sets the optimal price with
probability one every period. More speciﬁcally, we impose our main assumption in two slightly
diﬀerent ways. In the ﬁrst version of our model, we assume the probability distribution over
price choices is a logit function. The general equilibrium of this version of the model is therefore
a logit equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998): the probability of each ﬁrm’s choice is
a logit function which depends on the value of each choice; moreover, the value of each choice is
determined, in equilibrium, by the logit choice probabilities of other ﬁrms.
While this version of the model does not impose price stickiness directly, the risk of errors
gives rise to a certain degree of endogenous price stickiness. Because they fear they may “trem-
ble” when choosing a new price, ﬁrms may refrain from adjusting, on precautionary grounds,
even when their current price is not exactly optimal. Whenever the ﬁrm’s price is suﬃciently
close to the optimum, it prefers to “leave well enough alone”, thus avoiding the risk of making
a costly mistake. Hence behavior has an (S,s) band structure, in which adjustment occurs only
if the current price is suﬃciently far from the optimum.
In a second version of our model, we derive logit behavior from an assumption that precision
is costly. We show that the distribution of price adjustments takes logit form if decision costs are
proportional to entropy reduction. Thus, this speciﬁcation involves a cost of price adjustment,
but it is not a “menu cost” in the sense of labor time devoted to the physical task of adjusting
posted prices. Instead, the cost of price adjustment can be understood as a cost of managerial
control, consistent with the evidence of Zbaracki et al. (2004).
The logit framework for modeling bounded rationality has been widely applied in experi-
mental game theory, where it has successfully explained play in a number of games where Nash
equilibrium performs poorly, such as the centipede game and Bertrand competition games (McK-
elvey and Palfrey 1998; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2002). It has been much less frequently
1For their helpful comments, we thank Fernando ´ Alvarez, Jordi Gal´ ı, Kevin Lansing, John Leahy, Bartosz
Mackowiak, Filip Matejka, Antonella Tutino, Mirko Wiederholt, Jonathan Willis, and seminar participants at the
Bank of Spain, the San Francisco Fed, the ECB, HEC Paris, the Federal Reserve Board, SNDE 2010, Zeuthen
Macroeconomics 2010, the 11th CeNDEF workshop, SED 2010, CEF 2010, the 2010 Econometric Society World
Congress, and ASSA 2011. Views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with
those of the Bank of Spain, the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, or the Federal Reserve Board.8
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applied in other areas of economics; we are unaware of any application of logit equilibrium in-
side a dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model.2 The absence of logit modeling in
macroeconomics may be due, in part, to discomfort with the many potential degrees of freedom
opened up by moving away from the benchmark of full rationality. However, since logit equilib-
rium is just a one-parameter generalization of fully rational choice, it actually imposes much of
the discipline of rationality on the model.
Another possible reason why macroeconomists have so rarely considered error-prone choice
is that errors imply heterogeneity; the computational simplicity of a representative agent model
may be lost if agents diﬀer because of small, random mistakes. However, when applied to
state-dependent pricing, this problem is less relevant, since it has long been argued that it is
important to allow for heterogeneity in order to understand the dynamics of “sticky” adjustment
models (see for example Caballero 1992, and Golosov and Lucas 2007). Moreover, we have
shown (Costain and Nakov 2008B) how distributional dynamics can be tractably characterized
in general equilibrium, without relying on special functional forms or questionable numerical
aggregation assumptions. The same numerical method we used in that paper (Reiter 2009) can
be applied to a logit equilibrium model; in fact, the smoothness of the logit case makes it even
easier to compute than the fully rational case. We therefore ﬁnd that logit equilibrium opens
the door to tractable models with implications both for macroeconomic and for microeconomic
data.
Summarizing our main ﬁndings, both versions of our model are consistent with several “puz-
zling” stylized facts from micro price adjustment data. Our model implies that many large and
small price changes coexist (see Fig. 2), in contrast to the implications of the standard ﬁxed
menu cost model (Midrigan, 2011; Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2009). It
also implies that the probability of price adjustment decreases rapidly over the ﬁrst few months,
and then remains essentially ﬂat (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2009).
Third, we ﬁnd that the standard deviation of price changes is approximately constant, inde-
pendent of the time since last adjustment (Klenow and Malin, 2009). The Calvo model implies
instead that price changes are increasing in the time since last adjustment. Fourth, “extreme”
prices are more likely to have been recently set than are prices near the center of the distribution
(Campbell and Eden, 2010). While a variety of explanations have been oﬀered for some of these
observations (including sales, economies of scope in price setting, and heterogeneity among price
setters), our framework matches all these facts in a very simple way, using only one degree of
freedom in the parameterization.
Finally, we calculate the eﬀects of money supply shocks in our framework. Given the degree
of rationality that best ﬁts microdata, the eﬀect of money shocks on consumption is similar to
that in the Golosov-Lucas (2007) ﬁxed menu cost setup. The impact on consumption is much
weaker than the Calvo model implies because of a selection eﬀect: all the ﬁrms that require the
largest price adjustments do in fact adjust. Thus, a model in which price adjustment is slowed
down by the risk of mistakes ﬁts microdata better than a ﬁxed menu cost model, but implies
that the macroeconomy is relatively close to monetary neutrality.
2The logit choice function is probably the most standard econometric framework for discrete choice, and has
been applied to a huge number of microeconometric contexts. But logit equilibrium, in which each player makes
logit decisions, based on payoﬀ values which depend on other players’ logit decisions, has to the best of our
knowledge rarely been applied outside of experimental game theory.9
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1.1 Related literature
Early sticky price frameworks based on “menu costs” were studied by Barro (1972), Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977), and Mankiw (1985). General equilibrium solutions of these models have
only been attempted more recently, at ﬁrst by ignoring idiosyncratic shocks (Dotsey, King, and
Wolman 1999), or by strongly restricting the distribution of such shocks (Danziger 1999; Gertler
and Leahy 2006). Golosov and Lucas (2007) were the ﬁrst to include frequent large idiosyncratic
shocks in a quantitative model of state-dependent pricing, and approximately calculated the
resulting equilibrium dynamics. However, while menu costs have been an inﬂuential idea in
macroeconomics, the fact that price changes come in a wide variety of sizes, including some very
small ones, is hard for the menu cost framework to explain.
In particular, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) have shown that the distribution of price changes
remains puzzling even if we allow for many sectors with diﬀerent menu costs. As a possible
explanation for the presence of small adjustments, Lach and Tsiddon (2007) and Midrigan (2010)
proposed economies of scope in the pricing of multiple goods: a ﬁrm that pays to correct one
large price misalignment might get to change other, less misaligned, prices on the same menu
costlessly. An extensive empirical literature has recently taken advantage of scanner data to
document other microeconomic facts about retail price adjustment, many of which are puzzling
when viewed through the lenses of the Calvo model or the menu cost model; references include
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Klenow and Malin (2009), and Campbell and Eden (2010).
Rather that assuming a menu cost, our model delivers price stickiness as the result of near-
rational behavior. In this it is similar in spirit to Akerlof and Yellen (1985), who assume ﬁrms
sometimes make mistakes if they are not very costly. Our setup is also closely related to the
“rational inattention” literature (e.g. Sims, 2003; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). Whereas
that literature imposes an entropy constraint on the ﬂow of information from the economic
environment to the decision-maker, we instead use changes in entropy as a measure of the cost
of precise decisions. A number of game-theoretic papers have modeled near-rational behavior in
the same way, including Stahl (1990) and Mattsson and Weibull (2002).
Technically, the only diﬀerence between using entropy to measure the cost of precision and
using entropy to measure information ﬂow is that in the former case, the ﬁrm’s decisions are
a function of its true state (its productivity and price) at time t, whereas in the latter the
ﬁrm’s decisions depend on its prior about the state of the world. One possible interpretation of
our environment, which features full information but imperfect decisions, is that the decision-
maker (e.g. the CEO of a large corporation) is fully rational and has complete information
about the environment, but acts subject to an implementation constraint which prevents him
from perfectly communicating and enforcing his decisions throughout the organization. Given
this imperfect implementation, the decisionmaker sometimes rationally prefers “not to call a
meeting” and leave prices as they are, as long as the ﬁrm is doing reasonably well.
2 Sticky prices in partial equilibrium
In subsection 2.1, we describe the partial equilibrium decision of a monopolistically competitive
ﬁrm that sometimes makes small errors when it adjusts its price. Concretely, we assume the price
probabilities are governed by a multinomial logit. Subsection 2.2 discusses how our framework
diﬀers from the Calvo and menu cost approaches. In subsection 2.3, we take a more structural
approach, and show how the multinomial logit can be derived from a cost function for error
avoidance. We postpone discussion of general equilibrium until Section 3.10
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2.1 The monopolistic competitor’s decision
Suppose that each ﬁrm i produces output Yit under a constant returns technology, with labor
Nit as the only input, and faces idiosyncratic productivity shocks Ait:
Yit = AitNit
The idiosyncratic shocks Ait are given by a time-invariant Markov process, iid across ﬁrms.
Thus Ait is correlated with Ai,t−1 but is uncorrelated with other ﬁrms’ shocks. For numerical




Firms are monopolistic competitors, facing the demand curve Yit = ϑtP− 
it ,w h e r eϑt rep-
resents aggregate demand. A ﬁrm’s only control variable is its price; that is, we assume ﬁrms
must fulﬁll all demand at the price they set. They hire in competitive labor markets at wage
rate Wt,s op e r i o dt proﬁts are














Likewise, a ﬁrm that produces with price Pit and productivity Ait at time t has some discounted
present value, which we write as Vt(Pit,A it). The time subscript on the value function denotes
all dependence on aggregate conditions, such as aggregate shocks or deterministic trends.4
At each point in time, a ﬁrm must decide whether or not to adjust its price. To make this
decision, it compares the value of maintaining its previous price with the value of choosing a
new one. A ﬁrm that begins period t with some inital price ˜ Pit receives value Vt( ˜ Pit,A it)i fi t
chooses not to adjust its price. If it instead chooses to adjust, it faces a risk of error in the
new price it sets. Note that since we regard decisions as error-prone, the ﬁrm’s decision process
determines a distribution across its possible actions, rather than picking out a single optimal
value. We assume a distribution such that the probability of choosing any given price is a
smoothly increasing function of the value of choosing that price. This is the key assumption of
our model.
As is common in microeconometrics and experimental game theory, we assume the distribu-
tion of errors is given by a multinomial logit. In order to treat the logit function as a primitive
of the model, we deﬁne its argument in units of labor time. That is, since the costs of decision-
making are presumably related to the labor eﬀort (in particular, managerial labor) required to
calculate and communicate the chosen price, we divide the values in the logit function by the
wage rate, to convert them to time units. Hence, the probability πt(Pj|Ait)o fc h o o s i n gp r i c e













3Theoretically, our model would be well-deﬁned with a continuum of possible values of productivity Ait and
also a continuum of possible prices Pit. However, our numerical solution method requires us to approximate the
continuous case by a ﬁnite grid of possible productivities and prices. Therefore, for notational convenience, we
deﬁne the model on a discrete grid from the start.
4We could instead write Vt(Pit,A it)a sV (Pit,A it,Ωt), where Ωt represents the aggregate state of the economy.
For more concise notation we just write V with a time subscript.11
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The parameter κ in the logit function can be interpreted as representing the degree of noise in
the decision; in the limit as κ → 0 it converges to the policy function under full rationality, in
which the optimal price is chosen with probability one.5
We will use the notation Eπ
t to indicate an expectation taken under the logit probability (1).
The ﬁrm’s expected value, conditional on adjusting to a new price P  ∈ ΓP,i st h e n
Eπ


















The expected value of adjustment is
Dt(Pit,A it) ≡ Eπ
t Vt(P ,A it) − Vt(Pit,A it)( 3 )
We assume the ﬁrm adjusts its price if and only if the expected gain from adjustment is non-
negative. That is, the probability of adjustment can be written as
λ(Dt(Pit,A it)) = 1(Dt(Pit,A it) ≥ 0) (4)
where 1(x) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if statement x is true, and zero otherwise.
We can now state the Bellman equation that governs a ﬁrm’s value of producing at any given
price P. The Bellman equation in this case is:
























where Qt,t+1 is the ﬁrm’s stochastic discount factor. Note that the aggregate price level is absent
from the above expression; it is subsumed into ϑt, as we show in Section 3. On the left-hand side
and in the current proﬁts term, P refers to a given ﬁrm i’s price Pit at the time of production.I n
the expectation on the right, P represents the price   Pi,t+1 at the beginning of period t+1,which
i st h es a m ea sPit, and subsequently may (with probability λ) or may not (with probability
1 − λ) be adjusted prior to time t + 1 production.
We can simplify substantially by noticing that the value on the right-hand side of the equation
is just the value of continuing without adjustment, plus the expected gains from adjustment,























Dt+1(P,A ) ≥ 0
 
Dt+1(P,A )( 7 )
5Alternatively, logit models are often written in terms of the inverse parameter ξ ≡ κ
−1,w h i c hc a nb e
interpreted as a measure of rationality rather than a measure of noise.12
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2.2 Alternative models of sticky prices
To better interpret our results, we will compare simulations of our framework with simulations
of two standard models of nominal rigidity: the Calvo model and the ﬁxed menu cost (FMC)
model. Both these models are consistent with Bellman equation (6) if we redeﬁne the expected
gains function G appropriately.
In the Calvo model, adjustment occurs with a constant, exogenous probability ¯ λ, and con-
ditional on adjustment, the ﬁrm sets the optimal price. This means λ(Dt+1(P,A )) = ¯ λ and
Dt+1(P,A )=V ∗
t+1(A ) − Vt+1(P,A ), where
V ∗
t+1(A )=m a x
P  Vt+1(P ,A  ). (8)
Therefore (7) is replaced by
Gt+1(P,A ) ≡ ¯ λ
 
V ∗
t+1(A ) − Vt+1(P,A )
 
. (9)
In the FMC model, the ﬁrm adjusts if and only if the gains from adjustment are at least as
l a r g ea st h em e n uc o s tα, which is a ﬁxed, exogenous quantity of labor. If the ﬁrm adjusts, it pays
the menu cost and sets the optimal price. So the probability of adjustment is λ(Dt+1(P,A )) =
1(Dt+1(P,A ) ≥ αWt+1), where Dt+1(P,A )=V ∗
t+1(A )−Vt+1(P,A ). Therefore (7) is replaced
by
Gt+1(P,A ) ≡ 1
 
Dt+1(P,A ) ≥ αWt+1
  
Dt+1(P,A ) − αWt+1
 
. (10)
2.3 Deriving logit choice from a control cost function
The logit assumption (1) has the desirable property that the probability of choosing any given
price is a smoothly increasing function of the value of that price. However, many other distri-
butions have the same property. Is there any good reason for assuming a logit, other than its
prominence in game theory and econometrics?
One way to derive a logit error distribution is to assume that managerial decision-making is
costly. Thus, let us suppose that greater precision in the price choice (equivalently, a decrease in
errors) requires greater managerial time. In particular, following Stahl (1990) and Mattsson and
Weibull (2002), we will assume that the time cost of more precise choice is proportional to the
reduction in the entropy of the choice variable, normalizing the cost of perfectly random decisions












Here κ is the marginal cost of entropy reduction in units of labor time. This cost function is
nonnegative and convex. It takes its maximum value, κln(#P) > 0, for any distribution that
6See also Marsili (1999), Baron et al. (2002), or Matejka and McKay (2011).
7Our normalization of the level of costs is equivalent to deﬁning the cost function in terms of relative entropy
(also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence). That is, by setting the cost of choosing a uniform distribution to
zero, we are making the cost function proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(p||q) between the price
variable p and a random variable q that is uniform over the support of p. See Mattsson and Weibull (2002) for
details.13
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places all probability on a single price p ∈ ΓP. It takes its minimum value, zero, for a uniform
distribution.8
While this version of our framework involves a cost of price adjustment, it should not be
interpreted as the “menu cost” of the physical task of altering the posted price, but rather
as a cost of managerial eﬀort. We now show how to derive a logit distribution from this cost
function. Consider a ﬁrm that has chosen to update its price at time t, and is now deciding which
new price Pj to set, on the ﬁnite grid ΓP ≡
 
P1,P2,...P#P 
. The optimal price distribution
− → π maximizes ﬁrm value, net of computational costs (which we convert to nominal terms by















πj = 1 (12)
The ﬁrst-order condition for πj is
V j − κWt(1 + lnπj) − μ =0 ,
where μ is the multiplier on the constraint. Some rearrangement yields:























optimal probabilities (13) reduce to the logit formula (1). Thus the noise parameter in the logit
function corresponds to the marginal cost of entropy reduction in the control cost problem.
Taking logs in the ﬁrst-order condition (13), we can calculate a simple analytical formula for
the value of problem (12). Using lnπj = V j














Of course, if we interpret the logit choice distribution as the result of costly managerial time,
these costs need to be subtracted out of the value function. The description of the ﬁrm’s problem
in subsection 2.1 remains valid, except for the expected value of adjustment. Equation (3) is
replaced by
Dt(Pit,A it) ≡ Eπ













⎠ − Vt(Pit,A it). (15)
The Bellman equation is then given by (6)-(7) as before.
Therefore, in our simulations below, we will report two speciﬁcations of our model. One
speciﬁcation, abbreviated as ‘PPS’, is deﬁned by (3), (6), and (7), so that logit choice is simply
interpreted as a decision process near to, but varying around, the optimal choice. The second
speciﬁcation, indicated by ‘ENT’, is deﬁned by (14), (6), and (7), so logit choice is interpreted
as the result of optimal decision-making constrained by entropy reduction costs.
8If π is uniform, then π(p)=1 /#P for all p ∈ Γ
P, which implies

j∈ΓP π(p)ln(π(p)) = −ln(#P).14
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2.4 Relation to information-theoretic models
Before leaving this section we discuss the relationship between our framework and the “rational
inattention” papers like Sims (2003), Woodford (2009), and more recently Matejka and McKay
(2011), that are explicitly based on information theory. Note that by imposing a cost function
on error reduction we are emphasizing the managerial costs of evaluating information, choosing
an optimal policy, and communicating it within the ﬁrm, but by treating (12) as a decision under
full information we are ignoring the costs of receiving information. The information-theoretic
approach instead takes account of all four of these stages of information processing.
Thus, our setup could be interpreted as the problem of a manager who costlessly absorbs the
content of all the world’s newspapers (and other data sources) with her morning coﬀee, but who
faces costs of using that information. The information-theoretic approach allows for costs of
receiving the morning’s information too. Thus while the information-theoretic approach imposes
a Shannon entropy constraint on the whole ﬂow of information from reception to communicating
choices, our approach imposes a Shannon entropy constraint only on the ﬂow of information
inside the manager’s head and then within her ﬁrm.
Intuitively, we believe all these stages of information ﬂow imply important costs. Our only
reason for ignoring the ﬁrst stage of the information ﬂow is that by doing so we dramatically
reduce the dimension of the calculations required to solve our model. Since the rational inat-
tention approach assumes the ﬁrm acts under uncertainty, it implies the ﬁrm conditions on a
prior over its possible productivity levels (which is a high-dimensional object that complicates
solution of the model). In our setup, the ﬁrm just conditions on its true productivity level.
Moreover, once one knows that entropy reduction costs imply logit, one can simply impose a
logit function directly (and then subtract oﬀ the implied costs) rather than explicitly solving for
the form of the error distribution. These facts make our approach entirely tractable in a DSGE
context, as we show in the next two sections.
Given the similarity between our approach and that of the rational inattention literature,
it is likely that the two approaches will have many similar implications. Rational inattention
may have policy-relevant empirical implications which our model does not capture; this is a
relevant question for future research. But if the implications of the two approaches turn out to
be essentially the same, our setup may be preferred for its greater tractability.
3 General equilibrium
We next embed this partial equilibrium framework into a dynamic New Keynesian general
equilibrium model. For comparability, we use the same structure as Golosov and Lucas (2007).
Besides the ﬁrms, there is a representative household and a central bank that sets the money
supply.
3.1 Households
The household’s period utility function is
u(Ct) − x(Nt)+v (Mt/Pt);15
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payoﬀs are discounted by factor β per period. Consumption Ct is a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz aggre-
gate of diﬀerentiated products:
Ct =






   
 −1
.
Nt is labor supply, and Mt/Pt is real money balances. The household’s period budget constraint
is   1
0
PitCitdi + Mt + R−1
t Bt = WtNt + Mt−1 + Tt + Bt−1 + Divt,
where
  1
0 PitCitdi is total nominal spending on the diﬀerentiated goods. Bt represents nominal
bond holdings, with interest rate Rt − 1; Tt represents lump sum transfers received from the
monetary authority, and Divt represents dividend payments received from the ﬁrms. In this con-
text, optimal allocation of consumption across the diﬀerentiated goods implies Cit =( Pt/Pit) Ct,
where Pt is the price index Pt ≡





3.2 Monetary policy and aggregate consistency
For simplicity, we assume the central bank follows an exogenous stochastic money growth rule:
Mt = μtMt−1, (16)
where μt = μexp(zt), and zt is AR(1):
zt = φzzt−1 +  z
t. (17)
Here 0 ≤ φz < 1a n d z
t ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σ2
z) is a money growth shock. Thus the money supply
trends upward by approximately factor μ ≥ 1 per period on average. Seigniorage revenues are
paid to the household as a lump sum transfer, and the public budget is balanced each period.
Therefore the public budget constraint is
Mt = Mt−1 + Tt.
Bond market clearing is simply Bt = 0. Market clearing for good i implies the following
demand and supply relations for ﬁrm i:
Yit = AitNit = Cit = P 
t CtP− 
it . (18)












it di ≡ ΔtCt. (19)
The labor market clearing condition (19) also deﬁnes a weighted measure of price dispersion,





it di. which generalizes the dispersion measure in Yun (2005) to allow for
heterogeneous productivity. An increase in Δt decreases the consumption goods produced per
unit of labor, eﬀectively acting like a negative shock to aggregate productivity.
Aggregate consistency also requires that the demand curve and the discount factor that
appear in the ﬁrm’s problem be consistent with the household’s problem. In particular, to make16
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the ﬁrm’s problem (6) consistent with the goods market clearing conditions (18), the aggregate
demand shift factor must be
ϑt = CtP 
t . (20)
Also, we assume that the representative household owns the ﬁrms, so the stochastic discount
factor in the ﬁrm’s problem must be consistent with the household’s Euler equation. This implies





To write the ﬁrm’s problem in general equilibrium, we simply plug (20) and (21) into the ﬁrm’s
problem (6). Then the value of producing with price Pit = P and productivity Ait = A is





















where Gt+1(P,A ) has the form described in equation (7). G in turn depends on the adjustment
gain D, which takes the form (3) if we impose a logit choice distribution directly, or the form
(14) if we derive logit choice by imposing entropy control costs.
3.3 State variable
At this point, we have spelled out all equilibrium conditions: household and monetary authority
behavior has been described in this section, and the ﬁrms’ decision was stated in Section 2. Thus
can now identify the aggregate state variable Ωt. Aggregate uncertainty in the model relates
only to the money supply Mt. But since the growth rate of Mt is AR(1) over time, the latest
deviation in growth rates, zt, is a state variable too. There is also a continuum of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks Ait, i ∈ [0,1]. Finally, since ﬁrms cannot instantly adjust their prices, they
are state variables too. More precisely, the state includes the joint distribution of prices and
productivity shocks at the beginning of the period, prior to adjustment.
We will use the notation   Pit to refer to ﬁrm i’s price at the beginning of period t,p r i o rt o
adjustment; this may of course diﬀer from the price Pit at which it produces, because the price
may be adjusted before production. Therefore we will distinguish the distribution of production
prices and productivity at the time of production, which we write as Φt(Pit,A it), from the
distribution of beginning-of-period prices and productivity,   Φt(  Pit,A it). Since beginning-of-
period prices and productivities determine all equilibrium decisions at t, we can deﬁne the state
at time t as Ωt ≡ (Mt,z t,   Φt).
It is helpful here to compare the dimension of the general equilibrium calculation our model
requires with the calculation implied by a rational inattention model like Sims (2003). In our
model, the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic state has two dimensions (P and A), and the value function is
also contingent on the aggregate state Ω. Since the possible values of prices and productivities
are constrained to a grid, the distribution   Φ is an object of dimension #P#a, and thus Ω has
dimension #P#a + 2. In contrast, if we were to attempt to compute a rational inattention
model on the same grid, the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic state would have at least dimension #a:o n e
dimension for its price P and #a − 1 dimensions for its prior over possible values of A.T h e
true aggregate state of the economy Ω would then include at least Mt, zt,a n dadistribution17
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over prices and priors. Moreover, in general equilibrium ﬁrms might hold nondegenerate priors
over Ω itself, which would blow up the dimension of the problem exponentially again. In prac-
tice, therefore, some rational inattention models, like Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2011), have
restricted attention to a linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework where all distributions collapse to
a known form, whereas papers that have allowed for non-Gaussian shocks, like Tutino (2009)
and Matejka (2010), have studied partial equilibrium problems only.
3.4 Detrending
So far we have written the value function and all prices in nominal terms, but we can rewrite
the model in real terms by deﬂating all prices by the nominal price level Pt ≡





Thus, deﬁne mt ≡ Mt/Pt and wt ≡ Wt/Pt. Given the nominal distribution Φt(Pit,A it), let us
denote by Ψt(pit,A it) the distribution over real transaction prices pit ≡ Pit/Pt. Rewriting the




1− di =1 .
Notice however that the beginning-of-period real price is not predetermined: if we deﬁne   pit ≡
  Pit/Pt,t h e n  pit is a jump variable, and so is the distribution of real beginning-of-period prices
  Ψt(  pi,A i). Therefore we cannot deﬁne the real state of the economy at the beginning of t in
terms of the distribution   Ψt.
To write the model in real terms, the level of the money supply, Mt, and the aggregate price
level, Pt, must be irrelevant for determining real quantities; and we must condition on a real state
variable that is predetermined at the beginning of period. Therefore, we deﬁne the real state at
time t as Ξt ≡ (zt,Ψt−1), where Ψt−1 is the distribution of lagged prices and productivities. Note
that the distribution Ψt−1, together with the shocks zt, is suﬃcient to determine all equilibrium
quantities at time t: in particular, it will determine the distributions   Ψt(  pi,A i)a n dΨ t(pi,A i).
Therefore Ξt is a correct time t real state variable.
This also makes it possible to deﬁne a real value function v, meaning the nominal value
function, divided by the current price level, depending on real variables only. That is,






= Ptvt (pit,A it).
Deﬂating in this way, the Bellman equation can be rewritten as follows:
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4 Computation
4.1 Outline of algorithm
Computing this model is challenging due to heterogeneity: at any time t, ﬁrms will face diﬀerent
idiosyncratic shocks Ait and will be stuck at diﬀerent prices Pit. The reason for the popularity
of the Calvo model is that even though ﬁrms have many diﬀerent prices, up to a ﬁrst-order
approximation only the average price matters for equilibrium. Unfortunately, this property
does not hold in general, and in the current context, we need to treat all equilibrium quantities
explicitly as functions of the distribution of prices and productivity across the economy, and we
must calculate the dynamics of this distribution over time.
We address this problem by implementing Reiter’s (2009) solution method for dynamic
general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks. As a ﬁrst step,
Reiter’s algorithm calculates the steady state general equilibrium that obtains in the absence of
aggregate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are still active, but are assumed to have converged to their
ergodic distribution, so an aggregate steady state means that z =0 ,a n dΨ ,π, C, R, N,a n dw
are all constant. To solve for this steady state, we will assume that real prices and productivities
always lie on a ﬁxed grid Γ ≡ ΓP × Γa,w h e r eΓ p ≡{ p1,p 2,...p#p
} and Γa ≡{ a1,a 2,...a#a
}
are logarithmically-spaced grids of possible values of pit and Ait, respectively. We can then
think of the steady state value function as a matrix V of size #p × #a comprising the values
vjk ≡ v(pj,a k) associated with the prices and productivities
 
pj,a k 
∈ Γ. Likewise, the price
distribution can be viewed as a #p × #a matrix Ψ in which the row j, column k element Ψjk
represents the fraction of ﬁrms in state (pj,a k) at the time of transactions. Given this discretized
representation, we can calculate steady state general equilibrium by guessing the aggregate wage
level, then solving the ﬁrm’s problem by backwards induction on the grid Γ, then updating the
conjectured wage, and iterating to convergence.
In a second step, Reiter’s method constructs a linear approximation to the dynamics of the
discretized model, by perturbing it around the steady state general equilibrium on a point-by-
point basis. The method recognizes that the Bellman equation and the distributional dynamics
can be interpreted as a large system of nonlinear ﬁrst-order autonomous diﬀerence equations
that deﬁne the aggregate dynamics. For example, away from steady state, the Bellman equation
relates the #p×#a matrices Vt and Vt+1 that represent the value function at times t and t+1.
The row j, column k element of Vt is v
jk




this representation, we no longer need to think of the Bellman equation as a functional equation
that deﬁnes v(p,a,Ξ) for all possible idiosyncratic and aggregate states p, a, and Ξ; instead,
we simply treat it as a system of #p#a expectational diﬀerence equations that determine the
dynamics of the #p#a variables v
jk
t . We linearize this large system of diﬀerence equations
numerically, and then solve for the saddle-path stable solution of our linearized model using the
QZ decomposition, following Klein (2000).
The beauty of Reiter’s method is that it combines linearity and nonlinearity in a way ap-
propriate for the model at hand. In the context of price setting, aggregate shocks are likely to
be less relevant for individual ﬁrms’ decisions than idiosyncratic shocks; Klenow and Kryvstov
(2008), Golosov and Lucas (2007), and Midrigan (2008) all argue that ﬁrms’ prices are driven
primarily by idiosyncratic shocks. To deal with these big ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, we treat functions
of idiosyncratic states in a fully nonlinear way, by calculating them on a grid. But this grid-
based solution can also be regarded as a large system of nonlinear equations, with equations19
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speciﬁc to each of the grid points. When we linearize each of these equations with respect to
the aggregate dynamics, we recognize that aggregate changes are unlikely to aﬀect individual
value functions in a strongly nonlinear way. That is, we are implicitly assuming that aggregate
shocks zt and changes in the distribution Ψt have suﬃciently smooth impacts on individual
values that a linear treatment of these eﬀects suﬃces. On the other hand, we need not start
from any assumption of approximate aggregation like that required for the Krusell and Smith
(1998) method, nor do we need to impose any particular functional form on the distribution Ψ.
Describing the distributional dynamics involves deﬁning various matrices related to quantities
on the grid Γ. From here on, we use bold face to identify matrices, and superscripts to identify
notation related to grids. Matrices associated with the grid Γ are deﬁned so that row j relates to
the price pj ∈ Γp,a n dc o l u m nk relates to the productivity ak ∈ Γa. Besides the value function
matrix Vt, we also deﬁne matrices Dt, Gt,a n dΛt, to represent the functions dt, gt,a n dλ(dt/wt)
at points on the grid Γ. The distribution at the time of transactions is given by Ψt, with elements
Ψ
jk
t representing the fraction of ﬁrms with real price pit ≡ Pit/Pt = pj and productivity Ait = ak
at the time of transactions. We also deﬁne the beginning-of-period distribution   Ψt, with elements
  Ψ
jk
t representing the fraction of ﬁrms with real price   pit ≡   Pit/Pt = pj and productivity Ait = ak
at the beginning of the period. Shortly we will deﬁne the transition matrices that govern the
relationships between all these objects.
4.2 The discretized model
In the discretized model, the value function Vt is a matrix of size #p × #a with elements
v
jk
t ≡ vt(pj,a k) ≡ v(pj,a k,Ξt)f o r
 
pj,a k 
∈ Γ. Other relevant #p × #a matrices include the




t ≡ dt(pj,a k) ≡ Eπ

















Finally, we also deﬁne a matrix of logit probabilities Πt, which has its (j,k) element given by
π
jk














which is the probability of choosing real price pj conditional on productivity ak if the ﬁrm
decides to adjust its price at time t.
We can now write the discrete Bellman equation and the discrete distributional dynamics in
a precise way. First, consider how the beginning-of-period distribution   Ψt is derived from the
lagged distribution Ψt−1. Idiosyncratic productivities Ai are driven by an exogenous Markov
process, which can be deﬁned in terms of a matrix S of size #a × #a.T h e r o w m, column k
element of S represents the probability
Smk = prob(Ait = am|Ai,t−1 = ak).
Also, beginning-of-period real prices are, by deﬁnition, adjusted for inﬂation. Ignoring grids,
the time t−1 real price pi,t−1 would deﬂated to   pit ≡ pi,t−1/πt ≡ pi,t−1Pt−1/Pt at the beginning20
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of t. To keep prices on the grid, we deﬁne a #p × #p Markov matrix Rt in which the row m,
column l element is
Rml
t ≡ prob(  pit = pm|pi,t−1 = pl).
When the deﬂated price pi,t−1/πt falls between two grid points, matrix Rt must round up or
down stochastically. Also, if pi,t−1/πt lies outside the smallest and largest element of the grid,
then Rt must round up or down to keep prices on the grid.9 Therefore we construct Rt according
to
Rml
t = prob(  pit = pm|pi,t−1 = pl,πt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i f π−1
t pl ≤ p1 = pm
π−1
t pl−pn−1




pn+1−pn if p1 ≤ pm =m a x {p ∈ Γp : p<π −1
t pl}
1i f π−1





Combining the adjustments of prices and productivities, we can calculate the beginning-of-
period distribution   Ψt as a function of the lagged distribution of transaction prices Ψt−1:
  Ψt = Rt ∗ Ψt−1 ∗ S ,
where ∗ represents ordinary matrix multiplication. The simplicity of this equation comes partly
from the fact that the exogenous shocks to Ait are independent of the inﬂation adjustment that
links   pit with pit−1. Also, exogenous shocks are represented from left to right in the matrix Ψt,
so that their transitions can be treated by right multiplication, while policies are represented
vertically, so that transitions related to policies can be treated by left multiplication.
To calculate the eﬀects of price adjustment on the distribution, let Epp and Epa be matrices
of ones of size #P ×#P and #P ×#a, respectively. Now suppose a ﬁrm has beginning-of-t price
  pit ≡   Pit/Pt = pj ∈ Γp and productivity Ait = ak ∈ Γa. This ﬁrm will adjust its production
price with probability λ
jk
t , or will leave it unchanged (pit =   pit = pj) with probability 1−λ
jk
t .I f
adjustment occurs, the probabilities of choosing all possible prices are given by the matrix Πt.
Therefore we can calculate distribution Ψt from   Ψt as follows:
Ψt =( Epa−Λt) . ∗   Ψt + Πt . ∗ (Epp ∗ (Λt . ∗   Ψt)), (28)
where (as in MATLAB) the operator .∗ represents element-by-element multiplication, and ∗
represents ordinary matrix multiplication.
T h es a m et r a n s i t i o nm a t r i c e sR and S show up when we write the Bellman equation in













∈ Γ. Then the Bellman equation is
9In other words, we assume that any nominal price that would have a real value less than p
1 after inﬂation
is automatically adjusted upwards so that its real value is p
1. This assumption is made for numerical purposes
only, and has a negligible impact on the equilibrium as long as we choose a suﬃciently wide grid Γ
p.I fw ew e r et o
compute examples with trend deﬂation, we would need to make an analogous adjustment to prevent real prices
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Dynamic general equilibrium Bellman equation, matrix version:










The expectation Et in the Bellman equation refers only to the eﬀects of the time t+1 aggregate
shock zt+1, because the shocks and dynamics of the idiosyncratic state (pj,a k) ∈ Γ are completely
described by the matrices R 
t+1 and S. Note that since the Bellman equation iterates backwards
in time, its transitions are represented by R  and S, whereas the distributional dynamics iterate
forward in time and therefore contain R and S .
While equilibrium seems to involve a complicated system of equations, the steady state is
easy to solve because it reduces to a small scalar ﬁxed-point problem, which is the ﬁrst step of
Reiter’s (2009) method, to be discussed in the next subsection. The second step of the method,
in which we linearize all equilibrium equations, is discussed in subsection 4.4.
4.3 Step 1: steady state
In the aggregate steady state, the shocks are zero, and the distribution takes some unchanging
value Ψ, so the state of the economy is constant: Ξt ≡ (zt,Ψt−1)=( 0 ,Ψ) ≡ Ξ. We indicate
the steady state of all equilibrium objects by dropping the time subscript t, so the steady state
value function V has elements vjk ≡ v(pj,a k,Ξ) ≡ v(pj,a k).
Long run monetary neutrality in steady state implies that the rate of nominal money growth
equals the rate of inﬂation:
μ = π.
Morever, the Euler equation reduces to
π = βR.
Since the interest rate and inﬂation rate are observable, together they determine the required
parameterization of β. The steady-state transition matrix R is known, since it depends only on
steady state inﬂation π.
We can then calculate general equilibrium as a one-dimensional root-ﬁnding problem: guess-
ing the wage w, we have enough information to solve the Bellman equation and the distributional
dynamics.10 Knowing the steady state aggregate distribution, we can construct the real price
level, which must be one. Thus ﬁnding a value of w at which the real price level is one amounts
to ﬁnding a steady state general equilibrium.














10There are other, equivalent ways of describing the root-ﬁnding problem: for example, we could begin by
guessing C. Guessing w is convenient since we know that in a representative-agent, ﬂexible-price model, we have
w =
 −1
  . This suggests a good starting value for the heterogeneous-agent, sticky-price calculation.22
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We then ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of the value function:
V = U + βR  ∗ (V + G) ∗ S, (33)
together with the logit probability function Π, with elements








We can then ﬁnd the steady state distribution as the ﬁxed point of
Ψ =( Epa−Λ) . ∗   Ψ + Π . ∗ (Epp ∗ (Λ . ∗   Ψ)), (34)
  Ψ = R ∗ Ψ ∗ S . (35)











If so, an equilibrium value of w has been found.
4.4 Step 2: linearized dynamics
Given the steady state, the general equilibrium dynamics can be calculated by linearization.
To do so, we eliminate as many variables from the equation system as we can. For additional
simplicity, we assume linear labor disutility, x(N)=χN. Thus the ﬁrst-order condition for
labor reduces to χ = wtu (Ct), so we don’t actually need to solve for Nt in order to calculate
the rest of the equilibrium.11 We can then summarize the general equilibrium equation system
in terms of the exogenous shock process zt, the lagged distribution of idiosyncratic states Ψt−1,
which is the endogenous component of the time t aggregate state; and ﬁnally the endogenous
jump variables including Vt, Πt, Ct,a n dπt. The equation system reduces to
zt = φzzt−1 +  z
t, (37)
Mt = μeztMt−1, (38)
Ψt =( Epa − Λt) . ∗   Ψt + Πt . ∗ (Epp ∗ (Λt . ∗   Ψt)), (39)




























  ,v e c (Vt)
  ,C t,M t−1,π t
   ,
11The assumption x(N)=ξN is not essential; the more general case with nonlinear labor disutility simply
requires us to simulate a larger equation system that includes Nt.23
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then the whole set of expectational diﬀerence equations (37)-(41) governing the dynamic equi-








where Et is an expectation conditional on zt and all previous shocks.
To see that the variables in vector
− →
Xt are in fact the only variables we need, note that given
πt and πt+1we can construct Rt and Rt+1.G i v e n Rt, we can construct   Ψt = Rt ∗ Ψt−1 ∗ S 
from Ψt−1. Under linear labor disutility, we can calculate wt = χ/u (Ct), which gives us all








Finally, given Vt and Vt+1 we can construct Πt, Dt,a n dDt+1, and thus Λt and Gt+1. Therefore
the variables in
− →
Xt and zt are indeed suﬃcient to evaluate the system (37)-(41).
Finally, if we linearize system F numerically with respect to all its arguments to construct
the Jacobian matrices A≡D− →
Xt+1F, B≡D− →
XtF, C≡Dzt+1F,a n dD≡DztF, then we obtain





Xt + EtCzt+1 + Dzt =0 , (43)
where Δ represents a deviation from steady state. This system has the form considered by Klein
(2000), so we solve our model using his QZ decomposition method.12
5 Results
5.1 Parameterization
We calibrate our model to match the monthly frequency of price changes in US microdata. We
set the steady state growth rate of money to 0%. This is consistent with the zero average price
change in the AC Nielsen data of household product purchases (Midrigan, 2008), which we use
to test our model’s ability to replicate salient features of price adjustment behavior. The model,
like the data, addresses “regular” price changes, excluding temporary “sales”.
As in Costain and Nakov (2008A, B), we take most of our parameterization directly from
Golosov and Lucas (2007). Thus we set the discount factor to β =1 .04−1/12. Consumption
utility is CRRA, u(C)= 1
1−γC1−γ,w i t hγ = 2. Labor disutility is linear, x(N)=χN,w i t h
χ = 6. The elasticity of substitution in the consumption aggregator is   = 7. Finally, the utility
of real money holdings is logarithmic, v(m)=ν log(m), with ν =1 .
We assume productivity is AR(1) in logs: logAit = ρlogAit−1+εa
t, where εa
t is a mean-zero,
normal, iid shock. We take the autocorrelation parameter from Blundell and Bond (2000) who
estimate it from a panel of 509 US manufacturing companies over 8 years, 1982-1989. Their
preferred estimate is 0.565 on an annual basis, which implies ρ around 0.95 in monthly frequency.
The variance of log productivity is σ2
a =( 1−ρ2)σ2
ε,w h e r eσ2
ε is the variance of the innovation
εa
t. We set the standard deviation of log productivity to σa =0 .06, which is the standard
deviation of “reference costs” estimated by Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2008). Given
our grid-based approximation, this implies a maximum absolute log price change of 0.48, which
12Alternatively, the equation system can be rewritten in the form of Sims (2001). We chose to implement the
Klein method because it is especially simple and transparent to program.24
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covers, with an extra margin of 7%, the maximum absolute log price change of 0.45 observed in
the AC Nielsen dataset.13
The same technology and preferences are assumed for all adjustment models. Thus, for each
adjustment model we are left with one free parameter to calibrate. In the PPS and ENT cases,
this is the the logit noise parameter κ; for the other speciﬁcations we must either set the Calvo
adjustment rate λ or the menu cost α. In all three cases, we choose the parameter to match the
10% median monthly frequency of price changes estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
All three cases are well identiﬁed because κ and α both strongly aﬀect the frequency of price
changes (as does λ, of course).
5.2 Steady state microeconomic results
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize our main estimation results. The estimated noise parameter
for the PPS speciﬁcation is κ =0 .0428, implying a relatively small deviation from fully rational
behavior (i.e. low probabilities of large errors). Table 1 reports the losses implied by the errors
in our model: we report the mean loss suﬀered relative to a fully rational ﬁrm, as a percentage
of average revenues of a fully rational ﬁrm. In the baseline estimate, ﬁrms lose half a percent of
revenues due to imperfect rationality. Losses are of a similar order of magnitude in all the other
speciﬁcations too, being largest in the Calvo case and smallest under ﬁxed menu costs. The
distribution of losses can also be seen in the last panel of Figure 1, which shows the distribution
both before and after ﬁrms decide whether or not to adjust. In addition, Figure 1 illustrates
other equilibrium objects, such as the logit probability function π (ﬁrst panel), the adjustment
gains function D (second panel), and the adjustment probability λ (third panel).14
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 also shows the main statistics of price adjustment implied by our
estimate of the PPS speciﬁcation. With a single free parameter, we hit our single calibration
target, the 10% monthly frequency of price changes estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
(the last three columns of the table show data from several sources). The remaining moments
also appear quite consistent with the distribution of price adjustments in the data, which is
illustrated in Figure 2 (where it is compared to the ﬁxed menu cost and Calvo speciﬁcations).
The histogram of price changes shows 51 equally-spaced bins representing log price changes from
-0.5 to 0.5. The blue shaded bars in the ﬁgure represent the AC Nielsen data, and the black
line represents the results of our estimated model; the PPS speciﬁcation generates a widely
dispersed and mildly bimodal distribution like that seen in the data. The standard deviation
of price adjustments is matched relatively well by the PPS speciﬁcation: 14.5% in our model
versus 13.2% in the data. As in the data, half of the price adjustments in our baseline model
are price increases. Kurtosis is somewhat lower in our model (2.6) than in the data (3.5), as can
be seen from the relatively fat tails in the blue shaded data in the ﬁgure.
Notably, in Figure 2 we see that the PPS framework reproduces one of the puzzling obser-
vations in the context of the ﬁxed menu cost model: the coexistence of large and small price
changes. While typical price adjustments are large in our model, well over 10%, nonetheless
13The aggregate steady state is projected on a price-productivity grid Γ of 25 by 25 points. The 25 log
productivity steps of 0.02 cover four standard deviations of productivity above and below the average. Likewise,
25 log price steps of 0.02 cover the distance from the minimum to the maximum ﬂexible price associated with the
maximum and minimum productivities, respectively. In calculations with trend inﬂation extra points are added
in the price dimension to ensure that the ergodic distribution remains on the grid
14Figure 1a illustrates the PPS speciﬁcation, while Figure 1b shows the same equilibrium objects under the
ENT speciﬁcation.25
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around 20% (10%) of all adjustments are less than 5% (2.5%) in absolute value. All these
statistics are close to those the data. The Calvo and the ﬁxed menu cost models imply more
concentrated distributions,15 so both imply many absolute adjustments of less than 5%. How-
ever, the ﬁxed menu cost model concentrates the distribution of adjustment on two sharp spikes
around an empty center, with no adjustments smaller than 2.5%, whereas in the Calvo model
more than half of all changes are that small. Like the menu cost model, the PPS framework also
exhibits (S,s) behavior, as illustrated by the second-to-last panel of Figure 1; inside the (S,s)
bands ﬁrms choose not to adjust because the expected value of adjustment is not high enough to
justify the risk of an error. Nonetheless, since the actual size of price adjustment is determined
stochastically, a wide range of price adjustments is observed, including many small ones.
Another striking ﬁnding relates to the behavior of the adjustment hazard, that is, the prob-
ability of a price change as a function of the time since last adjustment. Figure 3 illustrates this
hazard, comparing two empirical data sets with our model and with the ﬁxed menu cost and
Calvo speciﬁcations. In our model, error-prone decisions imply that ﬁrms sometimes readjust
quickly after making a change, when their decision turns out to have been a mistake. This
accounts for the spike in the adjustment hazard at one month. The adjustment hazard remains
mildly decreasing over the next few months, driven by small errors subsequently compounded by
unfavorable shocks; it is thereafter largely ﬂat. This pattern is quite consistent with microdata;
it fails by construction in the Calvo model and also contrasts with the increasing hazard observed
in the FMC model. Many studies have suggested that decreasing hazards in the data may be
caused by heterogeneity in adjustment frequencies across diﬀerent types of products. However,
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) ﬁnd decreasing hazards even after controlling for heterogeneity
(see the blue dotted line in the ﬁgure). Likewise, Campbell and Eden (2010) ﬁnd that for a
given product (as deﬁned by the UPC code), recently-set prices are more likely to be adjusted
than “older” prices.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate our model’s implications for two other stylized facts from microdata.
In Figure 4, we see that in Klenow and Kryvtsov’s (2008) microdata, the average size of the
price adjustment is essentially invariant with the time since last price adjustment. The ﬁxed
menu cost model is strongly consistent with these data; the precautionary price stickiness model
also does fairly well, except at a horizon of one month. The Calvo model is strongly rejected
on this score, since it implies that the size of the price adjustment increases with the time since
last adjustment. Figure 5 illustrates Campbell and Eden’s (2010) ﬁnding that for any given
product, prices far from the time average are likely to have been set recently. The Calvo model
is again inconsistent with this observation. Both the ﬁxed menu cost and precautionary price
stickiness models generate a U-shaped relation between the percentage of “young” prices (those
set within the last month) and the deviation from the average price; the former understates the
relationship whereas the latter overstates it.
5.3 Eﬀects of changes in monetary policy
Figure 6 investigates the eﬀects of large changes in steady state inﬂation, compared with empiri-
cal observations from Mexican data reported by Gagnon (2007) for periods with annual inﬂation
rates of 5%, 29%, and 63%. The Calvo model is not shown, since the initial Calvo speciﬁcation
15To understand this result, note that conditional on a given productivity process, the PPS and ENT models
generate greater price variability than the Calvo and FMC models do, since price adjustments in the PPS and
ENT cases partially reﬂect errors, instead of being reactions to productivity shocks only.26
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with adjustment rate λ =0 .1 is incompatible with the rise in inﬂation shown in the ﬁgure (it
generates negative ﬁrm values at all inﬂation rates shown in the ﬁgure except for the lowest
one). The ﬁrst panel shows how the probability of adjustment rises with the steady state in-
ﬂation rate. The FMC, PPS, and ENT speciﬁcations all generate increases in the adjustment
frequency very similar to that observed in the data (the level of the adjustment frequency is
higher in the data than in the models, but this simply reﬂects the fact that we are comparing
US model calibrations with Mexican data).
The second panel shows how the standard deviation of price adjustments changes with the
inﬂation rate. The Mexican data show a small, nonmonotonic change in the standard deviation
as inﬂation rises. The PPS and ENT models both generate a standard deviation fairly close
to that in the data, and there is little change in this standard deviation as inﬂation rises. The
FMC model instead has a much smaller standard deviation of price adjustments; moreover,
this standard deviation drops dramatically (by more than half) as inﬂation rises to the levels
observed in Gagnon’s data. Finally, the third panel reports the fraction of price adjustments
that are increases; all three models somewhat exaggerate the rise in the percentage of price
increases, as compared with Gagnon’s data.
Figures 7-9 illustrate the implications of our estimated model for macroeconomic dynamics.
The ﬁgures show impulse responses of inﬂation and consumption to money supply shocks  z
t,
comparing the PPS and ENT speciﬁcations with the Calvo and FMC models. The AR(1)
persistence is set to φz =0 .8 monthly, implying quarterly persistence of 0.5. Under the baseline
parameterization, both the PPS and ENT versions of our model imply real eﬀects of monetary
shocks much smaller than those in the Calvo case. In fact, the consumption response for the ENT
speciﬁcation is almost identical to that associated with FMC; the initial impact on consumption
under PPS is similar, though in this case the response is more persistent. The same conclusions
can be drawn from Table 2, which quantiﬁes the real eﬀects of money shocks across models
following Golosov and Lucas (2007). The table reports the percentage of output variation that
can be explained by money shocks alone (assuming the money shock is suﬃciently variable to
explain 100% of inﬂation variation); it also reports the slope coeﬃcient of a “Phillips curve”
regression of output on inﬂation. Under both of these measures, the ENT and FMC models
have imply nearly identical degrees of monetary nonneutrality, whereas PPS implies real eﬀects
roughly twice as strong. Under the Calvo speciﬁcation, money shocks have real eﬀects roughly
four times stronger than they do in the PPS case.
The explanation for the weak response of consumption in our model is the same one Golosov
and Lucas (2007) identiﬁed in the FMC context: a strong “selection” eﬀect. In our model,
as in the case of FMC, adjustment occurs if and only if it is suﬃciently valuable. Therefore
all the most important price misalignments are eliminated after a money shock, which makes
money approximately neutral. To measure this eﬀect precisely, deﬁne the productivity-speciﬁc
optimal price level p∗k
t ≡ argmaxpvt(p,ak), and also x
∗jk
t ≡ log(p∗k
t /pj), the desired log price
adjustment of a ﬁrm at time t with productivity ak and real price pj. The actual log price
adjustment of such a ﬁrm (call it i) can thus be decomposed as xit = x
∗jk
t +  it,w h e r e it is





t   Ψ
jk
t ,a n d




t   Ψ
jk











Working Paper Series No 1375
August 2011








t   Ψ
jk
t +  t. (44)
To a ﬁrst-order approximation, we can decompose the deviation in inﬂation at time t as
Δπt = logΠt − logΠ = λΔx∗







t − λt)  Ψ
jk
t +Δ  t, (45)
where terms without time subscripts represent steady states, and Δ represents a change relative
to steady state.16
The ﬁrst term, It ≡ λΔx∗
t, can be called the “intensive margin”; it is the part of inﬂation due
to changes in the average desired adjustment, holding ﬁxed the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting. The
second term, Et ≡ x∗Δλt, can be called the “extensive margin”; it is the part of inﬂation due
to changes in the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting, assuming the average desired adjustment among







t − λt)  Ψ
jk
t , represents the part of inﬂation due to redistributing adjustment
opportunities from ﬁrms desiring small price adjustments to ﬁrms desiring large adjustments,
while ﬁxing the total number adjusting. Finally, there is a fourth term, Δ t, which is the change
in the average log error.
The inﬂation impulse responses associated with all the speciﬁcations considered are decom-
posed in Figure 9. By construction, all variation in inﬂation in the Calvo model is caused by
the intensive margin, since the probability of adjustment never varies in that speciﬁcation. The
PPS, ENT, and FMC speciﬁcations also show a rise in inﬂation due to the intensive margin,
since the money supply shock increases the average desired price adjustment. But in these cases
there is a much more important rise in inﬂation that goes through the selection eﬀect. The
money supply shock leaves some ﬁrms with an especially low real price; some of these ﬁrms then
decide to adjust their prices, which is the selection eﬀect. The larger price increase in these
speciﬁcations explains the small consumption impact seen in Figure 7.
Note ﬁnally that under all speciﬁcations the extensive margin eﬀect is negligible. This occurs
whenever we start from an inﬂation rate near zero: changing the fraction adjusting while holding
the mean adjustment ﬁxed must have a negligible impact since the mean adjustment must be
roughly zero when inﬂation is roughly zero. Likewise, the change in the average log error
(not shown) has a negligible impact on inﬂation. Instead, it is the reallocation of adjustment
opportunities to those that desire a large price increase, which is classiﬁed as the selection eﬀect,
that really matters for the inﬂation response.
5.4 Changing the risk of errors
Tables 1-2 and Figure 8 also show how the behavior of the PPS model varies with the parameter
κ that controls the amount of noise in the decision process. In Table 1, cutting noise in half
causes the frequency of price adjustment to rise from 10% to 12.3% per month, and the average
price change becomes smaller. This makes sense— with greater rationality, price adjustment is
less risky, so ﬁrms become willing to adjust even when their prices are not so far out of line.
Moreover, the elimination of errors also reduces the size of price changes directly by cutting out
one component of the price adjustment process.
16See Costain and Nakov (2011B) for further discussion of this decomposition.28
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Likewise, in Figure 8, cutting noise in half increases the initial spike in inﬂation, so that
the real eﬀect of the nominal shock is smaller than in the baseline calibration. In other words,
as rationality increases the PPS model eventually converges to a fully ﬂexible setup in which
money is essentially neutral.
5.5 Logit equilibrium versus control costs
Finally, it is interesting to contrast the behavior of the baseline logit equilibrium version of our
model, which we called ‘PPS’, with the version based on control costs, called ‘ENT’. The main
conclusion is that the implications of the two versions of the model are very similar, though
calibrating the ENT speciﬁcation results in somewhat lower frictions than PPS.
In terms of microeconomic implications, Table 1 and Figure 2 show that ENT implies a more
concentrated distribution, with smaller adjustments, than PPS. While PPS and ENT are both
quite consistent with the histogram of price adjustments, the ENT speciﬁcation is somewhat
more sharply bimodal than the data, whereas PPS is more weakly bimodal and more spread
out. Figures 3-5 show that PPS and ENT have qualitatively similar implications for several
other micro facts. In terms of impulse responses, Figures 7-9 show that ENT is even closer to
monetary neutrality than PPS, behaving almost identically to the ﬁxed menu cost model.
These ﬁndings can be understood by noting that we must recalibrate the noise parameter
κ when going from PPS to the ENT setup. In the PPS speciﬁcation, adjustment occurs if and
only if the value of adjustment D is nonnegative; we calibrate κ =0 .0478 in order to match
a 10% monthly adjustment frequency. Moving to the ENT speciﬁcation implies that ﬁrms are
less likely to adjust, ceteris paribus: adjustment does not occur unless the value of adjustment
(in labor units) exceeds the control cost C(− → π ). Therefore matching the same 10% adjustment
frequency requires a substantially lower degree of noise; the required calibration for the ENT
speciﬁcation is κ =0 .0050.
Since the ENT model combines a substantially lower noise parameter with a nonzero cost of
adjustment, it behaves more like the FMC model than PPS does. This is especially true in terms
of impulse responses. The lower noise parameter also explains why ENT exhibits smaller price
adjustments than PPS. Nonetheless, the presence of errors means that ENT generates a much
more realistic distribution of price changes than FMC does, with a smoother histogram that
includes some very small adjustments. The presence of errors also implies that ENT exhibits
price adjustment hazard that declines (slightly) with the time since last adjustment, in contrast
with the FMC model. The lower noise in the ENT calibration also explains why the mean loss
reported in Table 1 is lower for ENT than it is for PPS, in spite of the fact that no adjustment
costs are deducted from the value function under the PPS speciﬁcation.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the pricing behavior of near-rational ﬁrms subject to idiosyncratic and ag-
gregate shocks which can adjust their prices at any time, but may make mistakes. We model
error-prone behavior by assuming ﬁrms play a dynamic logit equilibrium. Prices are therefore
endogenously sticky: when a ﬁrm’s current price is suﬃciently close to the optimum, it prefers
to leave well enough alone, avoiding the risk of accidentally choosing a worse price.
This way of modeling price stickiness is consistent with several observations from microdata
that are hard to explain in most existing frameworks. Even though the decision to adjust prices29
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has an (S,s) structure, nonetheless many small price changes coexist with larger ones. Moreover,
the price adjustment hazard exhibits negative duration dependence; the size of price changes is
largely independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment; and extreme prices tend to
have been set recently.
When we estimate the logit rationality parameter, our model matches both the frequency of
adjustment and the size distribution of price changes quite successfully. This is especially true
for the PPS speciﬁcation. Since our setup guarantees that ﬁrms making suﬃciently large errors
will choose to adjust, it generates a ”selection eﬀect” in response to nominal shocks that largely
mitigates the strong real eﬀects of money shocks found in the Calvo model.
While the Calvo model oﬀers one way to explain the presence of small price changes, it fails
to generate many other prominent micro facts. Our model performs considerably better than
Calvo in matching microdata, but because of its strong selection eﬀect, it generates far less
stickiness of the aggregate price level than the Calvo model does. Thus, resolving the “puzzle”
of small price adjustments need not, by itself, alter Golosov and Lucas’ conclusion that money
shocks have small real eﬀects.
As we hinted in the introduction, thinking of nominal rigidity as a near-rational phenomenon
makes it natural to consider mistakes both in the size and timing of price adjustment. We are
studying a model of this type in ongoing work (Costain and Nakov 2011C). It would also be
interesting to apply logit decision-making in many macroeconomic contexts other than price
setting.
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Fig. 1a. Properties of the steady state distribution: PPS speciﬁcation 1
Note: ﬁrst ﬁve panels show real prices p and costs 1/a as log deviations from mean. 2
First panel: Probability π of choosing real price p, conditional on cost 1/a. 3
Second panel: Adjustment value D, expressed as fraction of median ﬁrm value. 4
Third panel: Adjustment probability λ. 5
Fourth panel: Contour plot of beginning-of-period density of ﬁrms, ˜ Ψ. 6
Fifth panel: Contour plot of density of adjusting ﬁrms. 7
Sixth panel: Densities of adjustment values before adjustment (D, blue shading), and after adjustment (solid line). 836
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Fig. 1b. Properties of the steady state distribution: ENT speciﬁcation 1
Note: ﬁrst ﬁve panels show real prices p and costs 1/a as log deviations from mean. 2
First panel: Probability π of choosing real price p, conditional on cost 1/a. 3
Second panel: Adjustment value D, expressed as fraction of median ﬁrm value. 4
Third panel: Adjustment probability λ. 5
Fourth panel: Contour plot of beginning-of-period density of ﬁrms, ˜ Ψ. 6
Fifth panel: Contour plot of density of adjusting ﬁrms. 7
Sixth panel: Densities of adjustment values before adjustment (D, blue shading), and after adjustment (solid line). 837
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Size of price changes
Calvo
Fig. 2. Distribution of nonzero price adjustents: comparing models 1
Shaded blue area: Nonzero price adjustments in AC Nielsen data of Midrigan (2011), controlling for sales. 2
Black lines: model simulations under ﬁxed menu costs (left), Calvo model (middle), and ’PPS’ (right, solid) and ’ENT’ 3
(right, dotted) speciﬁcations of our model. 438
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Figures for “Precautionary Price Stickiness” 5
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Calvo
Fig. 3. Price adjustment hazard: comparing models 1
Red and blue dotted lines: price adjustment hazard as function of time since last adjustment, in data of Nakamura and 2
Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Kryvstov (2008). 3
Black lines: model simulations under ﬁxed menu costs (left), Calvo model (middle), and ’PPS’ (right, solid) and ’ENT’ 4
(right, dotted) speciﬁcations of our model. 539
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Figures for “Precautionary Price Stickiness” 6
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Fig. 4. Mean adjustment and price duration: comparing models 1
Blue dotted line: average absolute nonzero price change, in percent, as function of time since last adjustment, in data 2
of Klenow and Kryvstov (2008). 3
Black lines: model simulations under ﬁxed menu costs (left), Calvo model (middle), and ’PPS’ (right, solid) and ’ENT’ 4
(right, dotted) speciﬁcations of our model. 540
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Calvo
Fig. 5. Extreme prices tend to be young: comparing models 1
Blue dotted line: fraction of prices set no more than two months previously, as function of log deviation from product- 2
speciﬁc mean price, in data of Campbell and Eden (2010). 3
Black lines: model simulations under ﬁxed menu costs (left), Calvo model (middle), and ’PPS’ (right, solid) and ’ENT’ 4
(right, dotted) speciﬁcations of our model. 541
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Fig. 6. Eﬀects of trend money growth: comparing models 1
Black line with checks: Mexican data of Gagnon (2008), at annual inﬂation rates of 5%, 29%, and 63%. 2
Other lines: simulations of FMC (green with circles), PPS (red with dots), ENT (dotted pink). 3
First panel: average frequency of price adjustments, as function of inﬂation rate. 4
Second panel: standard deviation of nonzero price adjustments, as function of inﬂation rate. 5
Third panel: fraction of nonzero price adjustments which are increases, as function of inﬂation rate. 642
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Fig. 7. Impulse responses to money growth shock: comparing models 1
Simulated responses of inﬂation and consumption to a money growth shock, monthly autocorrelation 0.8. 2
Green squares: Calvo model; blue circles: ﬁxed menu costs; red line: ’PPS’ model; dotte pink: ’ENT’ model. 343
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Fig. 8. Impulse responses to money growth shock: eﬀects of noise parameter 1
Simulated responses of inﬂation and consumption to a money growth shock, monthly autocorrelation 0.8. 2
Red line: ’PPS’ model with baseline noise parameter, κ =0 .0428; green squares: ’PPS’ model with higher noise, 3
κ =0 .0856; blue circles: ’PPS’ model with lower noise, κ =0 .0214. 444
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Fig. 9. Inﬂation decomposition after money shock: comparing models 1
Intensive, extensive, and selection margins of inﬂation response to a money growth shock, monthly autocorrelation 0.8. 2
Green squares: Calvo model; blue circles: ﬁxed menu costs; red line: ’PPS’ model; dotted pink: ’ENT’ model. 3Working PaPer SerieS
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